I filed a AMENDED COMPLAINT adding the city and a police officer on 02/06/2018 but they have not appeared via. attorney nor answered the COMPLAINT as of this date. What shall I do?

The other people, non gov., have an attorney. I filed a PLAINTIFF’S FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS AND INTERROGATORIES TO DEFENDANTS PERSUANT TO RULE 7.020b ACTIVATING FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1.280–1.380 NOW APPLY TO THIS CASE (DEFENDANTS ARE REPRESENTED BY ATTORNEY) on 02/26/2018.

Do I move for Summary Judgement at the 30 days against the non-government tow company employees and not the city & police officer?

Do I file and REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS AND INTERROGATORIES for the city and police officer?

The COMPLAINT is quite sound and maybe it should be in the U.S. Courts and not State Court?

This MEMORANDUM OF LAW is made part of the Complaint as if fully set out in the COMPLAINT.

Statute Support
Upon a search of the state statutes non attorneys will come to the “reasonable belief”[means the actual knowledge or belief a prudent person should have without making an investigation, including any investigation of public records] that Title XL Chapter 715 is for giving instructions for the conditions to tow ANY vehicle parked on PRIVATE PROPERTY by tow company or police.
“715.07?Vehicles or vessels parked on private property; towing.—“
“(2)?The owner or lessee of real property, or any person authorized by the owner or lessee, which person may be the designated representative of the condominium association if the real property is a condominium, may cause any vehicle or vessel parked on such property without her or his permission to be removed by a person regularly engaged in the business of towing vehicles or vessels, without liability for the costs of removal, transportation, or storage or damages caused by such removal, transportation, or storage, under any of the following circumstances:” Title XL Ch.715.07 (2)

This law does not give any exceptions for law enforcement nor the towing company without the designated permission to remove a vehicle from private property.
Further search of the state and U.S. Constitutions non attorneys will come to the “reasonable belief” the Defendants abrogated the rights to property under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America and comparable Florida constitution without due process of law and created a breach of contract.
Had the Mercedes Benz been parked on public property, roadways, fire lanes or public alleyways the Lynn Haven policeman, Christopher Meachum would have the right to call for a tow whether an arrest be made or not.
City of Lynn Haven Florida, Policeman Christopher Meachum and DTR should have known the law as to whether they were acting within the law or not. It is clear from this statute and the constitutions that City of Lynn Haven, the Lynn Haven policeman, Christopher Meachum and DTR was not acting in accordance with the law.
An attorney may argue Title XL Chapter 713.78, but this would not give a reasonable man concise knowledge of the ability to tow without regulations as this section pertains to “Liens for recovering, towing, or storing vehicles and vessels” and not the removal from private property.
Plaintiff’s Administrator called the office of DTR the same day, July 9, 2017 at 1:50 PM and talked with Dispatcher for DTR, Nicole Puluer attempting to redeem the car. Plaintiff’s Administrator asked who their driver was. Nicole Puluer replied that it was Richard but that he cannot release the car due to it being a weekend even though the state statute says,
“That site must be open for the purpose of redemption of vehicles on any day that the person or firm towing such vehicle or vessel is open for towing purposes, from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. and, when closed, shall have prominently posted a sign indicating a telephone number where the operator of the site can be reached at all times. Upon receipt of a telephoned request to open th

e site to redeem a vehicle or vessel, the operator shall return to the site within 1 hour or she or he will be in violation of this section.” (2015 FL Statute Title XL Ch. 715.07 – (2)(a)1a) (emphasis added)

8. Nicole Xxxxxx did not know Richard’s last name. Nicole would not discuss business to redeem the car and said that the office manager can only release the car Monday through Friday. Plaintiff’s Administrator did not offer to pay a fee since they refused to redeem it or talk business until Monday through Friday, and, it is implied that Plaintiff was willing to pay merely by seeking to redeem the car. We know there is a hook up fee and would have gladly paid that fee which is why Plaintiff’s Administrator was there within the hour so that no further fees would be added as stated in Title XL Ch. 713.78(2)(d) and (9) below:
“Any law enforcement agency, she or he shall have a lien on the vehicle or vessel for a reasonable towing fee and for a reasonable storage fee; except that no storage fee shall be charged if the vehicle is stored for less than 6 hours.” Ch. 713.78, (2)(d) and “Failure to make good faith best efforts to comply with the notice requirements of this section shall preclude the imposition of any storage charges against such vehicle or vessel.” Ch. 713.78 (9). (emphasis added)

1. Defendants City of XXXXXXXX, Christopher XXXXXXXXX and DTR knew, or should have known, the laws pertaining to private property removal from private property and how long DTR can hold a car and the City of XXXXXXX and DTR failed in their responsibility for training all its employees to conform to the laws of the state of Florida and the United States and thus have all committed a crime.
Constitutional Support
This court must look at the Supreme Law of The Land for its controlling law and Florida constitution in the following: The Florida Constitution grants municipalities broad “governmental, corporate and propriety powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal func

tions and render municipal services.” Art. VIII, § 2(b), Fla. Const. (1968). It further permits municipalities to “exercise any powers for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law.” Id. (emphasis added).
In furtherance of this constitutional guarantee of local self-government, the state legislature adopted the Florida Municipal Home Rule Act in 1973. Section 166.021 of the Act provides: (1) As provided in s. 2(b), Art. VIII of the State Constitution, municipalities shall have the governmental, corporate, and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions, and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes, except when expressly prohibited by law [emphasis added].
In South Dakota v. Opperman, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the impound and inventory of a car that remained illegally parked in a no-parking zone after multiple citations had been left on the windshield. The court said, “In the interests of public safety and as a part of what the Court has called ‘community caretaking functions,’ automobiles are frequently taken into police custody. Vehicle accidents present one such occasion. Police will also frequently remove and impound automobiles which violate parking ordinances and thereby jeopardize both the public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic. The authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge.” (emphasis added)
Plainly we see the cities have the right to impound cars used in the commission of crimes, vehicles damaged in traffic collisions to the extent that they cannot safely be driven away, abandoned vehicles and cars that present traffic hazards or obstruct the normal traffic flow. In other circumstances, however, the cities right to impound is not so clear as is the situation in this cause of action.
Statutes vs. the Fourth

Amendment
Because the Constitution is the supreme law of the land (Article VI), states are not at liberty to empower their law enforcement officers to conduct seizures of property that may be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In Sibron v. New York, the Supreme Court considered the conflict between a state statute that purported to authorize certain seizures and the overriding command of the Fourth Amendment that all seizures be reasonable. Finding the seizure in that case unreasonable, the court said, “[A state] may not authorize police conduct which trenches upon Fourth Amendment rights. The question is not whether the search or seizure was authorized by state law. The question is rather whether the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”
The U.S. appellate courts and many state courts have drawn the same distinction, finding that vehicles impounded under state or local laws or policies were nevertheless unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In U.S. v. Squires, for example, New York City police impounded a car from a parking lot “for safekeeping” after arresting its occupant on a warrant. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that this seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the car could have been left lawfully parked in the parking lot as is the situation in this cause of action, and “the officers did not have a reasonable basis for concluding that it was necessary to take the Cadillac to the police station in order to protect it.” The Mercedes Benz was safely and properly parked, inventoried by Defendant xxxx, at the CVS parking lot with People on the way to take possession of it.
In U.S. v. Duguay, a drug suspect was a passenger in a car that was driven into a parking lot and parked. After he was arrested, the car was impounded and inventoried and drugs were found. The Illinois officers testified that it was their standard policy to impound all vehicles “for safekeeping” when an occupant had been arrested. The court found the impound to be an unreasonabl

e seizure and suppressed the resulting evidence: “The decision to impound an automobile is only valid if the arrestee is otherwise unable to provide for the speedy and efficient removal of the car from public thoroughfares or parking lots.” Finding that in that instance were two unarrested associates who were present and could have taken custody of the car, the court found the impound to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
In this instant case the Xxxxxx police officer Xxx was advised and informed by the arrestee that the Plaintiff’s Administrator was on his way to take possession of the car and testified to this fact in the criminal court trial of the arrestee [see XXXXXX County Circuit Case #1700-XXXCT].
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a civil suit arising from an Oregon officer’s impound of a car after citing the driver and passenger for traffic violations in Miranda v. City of Cornelius. Jorge Miranda, a licensed driver, was trying to teach his wife to drive. An officer saw errant driving and signaled the driver to stop. Mrs. Miranda pulled the car into the driveway of their home and stopped. Both occupants were cited and the officer impounded the car under local and state statutes authorizing an impound when a vehicle was driven by an unlicensed driver. The Mirandas brought a federal civil rights suit for violation of their Fourth Amendment rights, and the Ninth Circuit agreed that the impound was an unreasonable seizure. Although the city argued that the impound was lawful because it was authorized by local laws, the court said, “The decision to impound pursuant to the authority of a city ordinance or state statute does not, in and of itself, determine the reasonableness of the seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” Noting that the Mirandas’ car was lawfully parked in their own driveway the court ruled the seizure unreasonable. The court limited the circumstances under which a vehicle could lawfully be impounded: “The violation of a traffic regulation justifies impoundment of a vehicle if

the driver is unable to remove the vehicle from a public location without continuing its illegal operation. But an officer cannot reasonably order an impoundment in situations where the location of the vehicle does not create any need for the police to protect the vehicle or to avoid a hazard to other drivers.” [emphasis added]
All of the aforementioned theft and holding of property is permanent and continuing in nature.